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We use laboratory experiments to analyze decentralized decision-making in one-sided matching 
markets. We find that subjects tend to make decisions in line with theoretical models, as their 
offering and accepting decisions are only guided by the objective of improving upon the status 
quo. However, isolated individual mistakes, that do not disappear with experience or time, often 
make theoretically-stable matchings unstable in the laboratory. Markets with incomplete infor-
mation are especially prone to this problem. 
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Roommate markets, introduced by Gale and Shapley [11], consist of a (nite)
set of agents who have to be paired among themselves according to their
preferences. Despite the shortage of game theoretical papers on this subject
and the lack of non-cooperative mechanisms that implement the socially
desired outcomes, it is not dicult to nd applications to it. Examples
include the problem of nding roommates at the university that is frequently
used to illustrate the model (hence the name of the problem), matching lab
partners in a science class, creating a ight crew or a set of chess players who
need to form pairs to play a game. The roommate problem is also useful in
modelling exchange problems with a constraint on the size of the exchanges.
For instance, the kidney exchange problem introduced by Roth et al. [24]
was subsequently modeled by Roth et al. [25] as a roommate problem with
dichotomous preferences. Also, the roommate problem is a special case of two
more general models: hedonic coalition formation and network formation.
We focus on decentralized roommates markets, i.e. on markets where
agents seek and are matched with each other by successively forming block-
ing pairs. We do so, because in many actual matching markets there is no
central authority to match agents, nor is its existence assumed by the existing
theoretical literature.
Knuth [17] was the rst in addressing the existence of a convergence path
to stability in matching markets. Since then, several papers have been written
on the issue. Most of them study the theoretical conditions under which a
nite sequence of blocking pairs to a stable matching exists in matching
markets in the absence of a centralized procedure.1 Stability plays a key
role in matching markets, since stable matchings are considered the best
solution to the problem. A matching is said to be stable if there are no agents
preferring each other (or staying alone) rather than their current partners.
The other part of the literature reports ndings from laboratory experiments
and usually focuses on centralized matching mechanisms designed for two-
sided matching markets (e.g. Haruvy and  Unver [12], Niederle and Roth [19],
Roth and Xing [27],  Unver [28]). The list of experimental studies that look
at decentralized matching market is short and with one notable exception
all of them consider two-sided matching markets (Echenique et al. [4], Kagel
and Roth [14], Nalbantian and Schotter [18]). The only paper we are aware
of and that analyzes decentralized roommate markets is that of Eriksson and
Strimling [9] who are interested in how the size of the market and people's
1See for instance Roth and Vande Vate [26], Chung [1], Diamantoudi et al. [2], Klaus
and Klijn [15], Klaus et al. [16] and I~ narra et al. [13].
2preference structure inuence the outcome of a matching process.
A common conclusion of the previous experimental works is that matching
markets in the laboratory tend to deliver theoretically-unstable matchings.
While we observe similar global results in all of our treatments, our aim is
to analyze subjects' decentralized decision-making behavior to form block-
ing paths, and to understand why the market often fails to reach a stable
matching the way theoretical papers predict. Our ndings from decentral-
ized matching markets can also be relevant for centralized ones, as we look
directly at individual behavior without the black box created by a specic
matching mechanism or clearing house.
We implement a dynamic matching market in the experimental laboratory
in which oers can be made and decided upon at any moment. Only two
restrictions are introduced. First, subjects can send only one oer at a time,
and second, the market is open for a predetermined and announced period
of time. This setup has been chosen for its simple and intuitive rules that
closely mimic real-life examples. Our experimental design is a 2x2 design.
We study the matching market with two dierent preference proles under
two dierent informational treatments. In the rst treatment subjects have
complete information, while in the second individual preference orderings
constitute private information.
Many theoretical studies of strategic behavior in a matching market rely
on the assumption of complete information. This is a rather implausible
assumption since knowing the true preferences of every agent in the market
is more than we may reasonably expect from agents in most situations. The
literature, both theoretical and empirical, oers numerous results on the
importance of information, however it concentrates on two-sided matching
markets for which several non-cooperative mechanisms have been designed.2
We nd, in both informational treatments, that experimental subjects
tend to make decisions in line with theoretical models, in that they do not
take into consideration neither the other agents' status nor whether they
have formed a pair with them previously. In general, agents are only guided
by the objective of improving with respect to their status quo, as theoretical
2Roth [22] made the rst theoretical attempt to deal with the incomplete information
case. Ehlers and Mass o [7] study the Bayes-Nash equilibria of mechanisms that produce
stable matchings and nd a necessary and sucient condition for truthtelling to be an
equilibrium. Roth and Rothblum [23] and Ehlers [5], [6] are less ambitious and do not
aim at characterizing equilibria, but give advice to individuals on how to act in matching
markets when there is uncertainty about the others' strategies. As for experimental studies,
Pais and Pint er [20] and Pais et al. [21] report data on the role of information on individual
decision-making and the properties of several matching mechanisms in the school choice
and college admission models (both are two-sided matching problems).
3models assume. However, isolated individual mistakes often make subjects
abandon theoretically-stable matchings and the market frequently ends up
in an unstable one. As for the role of information, it does not seem to have
a signicant eect on subjects' rationality. However, the lack of informa-
tion about the others' preferences increases activity levels and more blocking
pairs are formed. Also, theoretically-stable matchings are abandoned more
frequently in the incomplete-information treatments.
The theoretical work presented by Klaus et al. [16] helps to put our em-
pirical ndings into perspective. They introduce a renement to the concept
of theoretically-stable matchings by allowing for mistakes in the individual
decision-making process. Nevertheless, while their solution is based on indi-
vidual mistakes whose probability is approaching zero, in the laboratory we
observe that mistakes do not disappear with time and experience, but tend
to persist in the laboratory.
2 The roommate problem
The roommate problem (Gale and Shapley, [11]) is dened by a set of agents
that must be divided into pairs. Each agent is assumed to have strict prefer-
ences over the other agents in the set and the prospect of remaining single.
Formally, a roommate problem is a pair (N;(x)x2N) where N is a nite set
of agents and for each agent x 2 N, and x is a complete, transitive and
strict preference relation dened over N.
An outcome of this problem is a matching, i.e. a partition of the set of
agents into pairs and singletons. A matching is unstable if there is a pair
of agents (not necessarily distinct) who prefer each other to their partners
under the matching. This pair of agents is called a blocking pair. Formally,
a matching  is a one-to-one mapping from N onto itself such that for all
x;y 2 N if (x) = y then (y) = x, where (x) denotes the partner of agent
x under the matching . If (x) = x, then agent x is single under . A pair
of agents fx;yg  N (possibly x = y) is a blocking pair of the matching  if
y x (x) and x y (y): (1)
One matching is obtained from another by satisfying a blocking pair as
follows. In the new matching the agents in the blocking pair are matched to
each other, their partners under the previous matching are unmatched and
all other agents are matched to the same partners. Formally, let fx;yg be a
blocking pair of . A matching 0 is obtained from  by satisfying fx;yg if




z if (z) 2 fx;yg
(z) otherwise.
A matching is called stable if it is not blocked by any pair of agents. Gale
and Shapley [11] show by using an example that a roommate problem can
have no stable matchings.
A common approach in the analysis of roommate markets is assuming
that agents have full knowledge of preferences and that they are rational, in
the sense that they only deviate from one matching to another if they improve
strictly with this movement. Under this assumption, Diamantoudi et al. [2]
showed that there exists a nite sequence of myopic blocking pairs leading to
a stable matching, whenever such a matching exists. Recently, I~ narra et al.
[13] proposed absorbing sets as a solution for roommate markets and showed
that these sets provide the stable matchings when they exist, and otherwise
they provide a non-empty set of matchings satisfying the property of outer
stability. That is, from any matching there is a nite sequence of myopic
blocking pairs leading to them. Klaus et al. [16] analyzed these sequences of
myopic blocking pairs in roommate markets, with and without stable match-
ings, by assuming that agents make mistakes in their decision with a small
probability. Their solution renement concept, i.e. the stochastically stable
matchings, is based on individual mistakes whose probability is approaching
zero. They show that whenever a stable matching exists it is also stochasti-
cally stable (and vice versa). In this experiment, for simplicity, we consider
roommate problems with a unique stable matching that, therefore, is also
stochastically stable.
3 Experimental design
We recruited 30 subjects to a computer laboratory through announcements
posted across the campus of the Universitas Kristen Satya Wacana in Salatiga,
Indonesia. They were informed that they would participate in a paid exper-
iment on decision-making. The experiment was programmed and conducted
with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, [10]).
Two sessions with dierent subject pools took place in August 2009. We
implemented one session with a low information environment in which par-
ticipants' preference proles were private information, and another with a
high information environment, in which participants knew also the others'
preference proles.
5At the beginning of each session, printed instructions were given to sub-
jects and were read aloud to the entire room. These instructions explained
all the rules determining the resulting payo for each participant. They were
written in Indonesian and presented sample screens to illustrate how the pro-
gram worked. The English translation of the instructions can be found in
Appendix B.
Each session consisted of one practice period and 10 paying rounds, and
lasted around 90 minutes. At the beginning of the experiment the computer
randomly assigned subjects to groups of 5. We used anonymous stranger
matching, i.e. participants were not informed about who the other members
of their group were, and they were informed that groups were changing ran-
domly throughout the session. Subjects were not allowed to communicate
with each other. In each round, subjects were asked to make private decisions
about forming pairs with other members of their group.
The decentralized market that we implemented in the experimental lab-
oratory was inspired by the real-time search game implemented by Eriksson
and Strimling [9], a similar \free agency" treatment by Nalbantian and Schot-
ter [18], and partly by the theoretical model described by Klaus et al. [16].
Given that the scarce experimental literature on decentralized matching mar-
kets does not agree on the design, we implemented an intuitive market with
real-time interaction that allows to derive conclusions on individual behavior
related to theoretical models.3 In our sessions, each market round lasted for
4.5 minutes during which participants could send an oer to form a pair at
any moment to any other participant in the same group. However, a partici-
pant could only make one oer at a time, i.e. could not send a new oer until
the previous one has been either accepted, rejected by the other participant
or withdrawn by herself. Matched couples did not leave the market as they
could send and receive oers during the whole market round privately. In case
an already-matched participant's oer was accepted or an already-matched
participant accepted a new oer, the current partnership was dissolved and
the new one was formed (leaving the abandoned partner alone). Participants
were unmatched at the beginning of each round.
Subjects' preferences were induced by the monetary payo that they
earned depending on who their partner was at the end of each round. These
3The main dierence between our design and the \cocktail game" by Eriksson and
Strimling [9] is that we compute payos at the end of each market period, while they did
it in a continuous manner, looking at the life-time of each partnership. As for Echenique
et al. [4], although their game is dynamic, oers, decisions and the information ow
are not observed in real time. They are structured into two stages in which oers and
acceptance decisions are made separately by participants, without any information on
what is happening on the market.
6preferences were similar across subjects: every subject got 50 thousand In-
donesian Rupiah (IDR) for the top choice, 40 thousand for the second choice,
etc. Payos were computed according to the nal matching at the end of each
round. The nal payo of the session was computed as the average payo
over the 10 paying rounds. In order to keep the amount of real-time infor-
mation on screen manageable, a participant only received information on the
status of the oer she made and received, and on the current matching.
We implemented two numerical examples (games) of a roommate prob-
lem with one stable matching in each session (table 1). Participants played
the same example in 5 rounds in a row, but individual roles (labels) were as-
signed randomly in each round. Therefore, participants were likely to have a
dierent preference ordering in each round, while the global preference prole
only changed after round 5.
Table 1: The preference proles used in the experiment. Payos in thousand
IDR.
partner in game 1 game 2
rounds 1 - 5 rounds 6 - 10
player 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
1 10 50 30 20 40 10 50 40 20 30
2 30 10 20 50 40 30 20 50 40 10
3 30 40 10 20 50 10 20 30 50 40
4 50 10 40 30 20 50 40 20 10 30
5 30 40 20 50 10 30 50 20 40 10
stable matching
ff1,3g, f2,5g, 4g ff1,5g, f2,4g, 3g
The sessions/treatments diered in the amount of information that partic-
ipants had about one another's preferences. In the low information treatment
preferences constituted private information, participants knew only their own
payo tables and the only information that we gave them about the others
was that \they are similar".4 In the high information treatment participants
received on-screen information about all the others' payos.
At the end of the session, subjects were paid individually and conden-
tially. In addition to the 10 thousand IRD show-up fee, subjects earned
an average of 31 thousand IRD. The nal individual payo ranged from 25
thousand to 40 thousand IRD with a standard deviation of 3.5 thousand
IRD.5
4We did not specify any probability distribution or upper and lower limits for the
others' valuations in the low information treatment.
5The minimum wage in the area (Central Java) was around 550 thousand IDR per
74 Experimental results
This section presents our experimental ndings on individual behavior and
matching stability in general and in comparison between the two informa-
tional treatments. As for the two games, i.e. preference proles implemented
in the laboratory, although we observe some dierences, they seem to be
unsystematic and will not be emphasized in the text (they appear in the
tables).
We refer to matchings by 5-digit numbers whose ith digit represents par-
ticipant i's partner. For example, 12345 is the matching in which all partic-
ipants are alone (matched to themselves).
The statistical signicance of the reported dierences is based on standard
proportion and count z-tests. When not stated otherwise, the results are
signicantly dierent from each other at the usual signicance levels, i.e. the
p-value is lower than 0.1.
4.1 Rationality
Our database contains observations on 1497 oers out of which 511 were
accepted. Although matching theory suggests that blocking pairs are formed
based uniquely on the partners' payos, we have looked for alternative na ve
strategies in the laboratory. These have been dened with the help of three
characteristics: rationality (R), status (S), and history (H).
Three levels of rationality are considered. They represent selection criteria
from the set of eligible partners.
 Level -1: Send an oer to the agent that values the oerer most. This
level is only relevant in the high information treatment.
 Level 0: Send an oer to the most preferred agent.
 Level 1: Send an oer to an agent who is preferred to status quo, i.e.
the current partner.
Our decentralized matching market did not impose any restriction to
the set of eligible partners (other than the one-player-one-oer rule). We say
that status considerations are constraining the oering behavior, S(1), if only
unmatched players are considered when sending an oer. Similarly, personal
history may reduce the set of eligible partners in several ways out of which
the following are considered.
month in 2008.
8 Criterion 1: Only consider agents who have not been matched to the
oerer before.
 Criterion 2: Only consider agents who have not been matched to the
oerer nor have rejected the oerer before.
Table 2 shows that among the 12 possible na ve strategies in the low
information treatment and the 18 in the high information treatment, the
R(1) - S(0) - H(0) combination explains the data best by accounting for
96% of all oers. The use of the same strategy characterizes the entire
subject pool and accounts for 72% of the oers sent by the least predictable
participant (subject 3 in the complete information treatment). If subjects
are considered separately, the R(1) - S(0) - H(0) combination explains 95%
of their oer decisions on average (table 6). This strategy corresponds to
the rational behavior embedded in most theoretical models on the roommate
problem.
Observation 1. 96% of all oer decisions have been made to improve upon
the status quo without taking the others' status and history into account. If
subjects are considered separately, this strategy explains on average 95% of
the oer decisions.
The picture is less clear when acceptance decisions are considered, but the
R(1) - S(0) - H(0) combination still outperforms the other na ve strategies
both when decisions are pooled and when they are considered separately for
each participant.6 In this case the performance of R(1) - S(0) - H(0) and
R(0) - S(0) - H(0) lies close to each other in explaining the data due to the
small number of oers that had to be considered simultaneously (tables 3
and 7). However, the former never performs worse than the latter.
Observation 2. 75% of all acceptance decision have been made to improve
upon the status quo without taking the others' status and history into account.
If subjects are considered separately, this strategy still explains on average
75% of their acceptance decisions.
Although the R(1) - S(0) - H(0) combination, i.e. the theoretically rational
behavior, explains the vast majority of individual decisions, subjects seems
to make systematic mistakes whose probability is not zero nor converges to
zero with time and play experience. Klaus et al. [16] study the roommate
problem in an environment where agents make mistakes in accepting or re-
jecting oers. In their theoretical model oers appear randomly, given that
6The success of na ve strategies in explaining the observed behavior is signicantly
lower for acceptance decisions than for oer decisions.
9Table 2: Proportion of oer decisions in line with na ve strategies.
information incomplete complete total
game 1 2 total 1 2 total
# of oers 348 463 811 307 379 686 1497
% of oers by unmatched 61% 52% 56% 58% 48% 53% 55%
length (time) 67.5' 67.5' 135.0' 67.5' 67.5' 135.0' 270.0'
R(0) S(0) H(0) 44% 52% 49% 49% 61% 56% 52%
H(1) 42% 43% 43% 47% 52% 50% 46%
H(2) 28% 24% 26% 37% 36% 36% 30%
S(1) H(0) 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
H(1) 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
H(2) 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
R(1) S(0) H(0) 94% 96% 95% 96% 96% 96% 96%
H(1) 70% 62% 65% 72% 74% 73% 69%
H(2) 54% 40% 46% 60% 56% 58% 51%
S(1) H(0) 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
H(1) 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
H(2) 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
R(-1) S(0) H(0) - - - 4% 4% 4% -
H(1) - - - 31% 42% 37% -
H(2) - - - 3% 3% 3% -
S(1) H(0) - - - 0% 0% 0% -
H(1) - - - 0% 0% 0% -
H(2) - - - 0% 0% 0% -
R(): -1 - oer to the agent that values the oerer most, 0 - oer to the best
agent, 1 - oer to an agent who is better than the status quo;
S(): 0 - oer to matched or unmatched agents, 1 - oer to unmatched agents
only;
H(): 0 - oer to agents who have and who have not been a partner before, 1
- oer to agents who have not been a partner before, 2 - oer to agents who
have not been a partner nor have rejected before.
agents must decide upon a random sequence of partnerships and irrational
partnerships are formed with a small probability  > 0.7 Inspired by their
model, we have estimated  as the proportion of decisions that are not in line
with the R(1) - S(0) - H(0) combination.8 The  related to oers is roughly
7Klaus et al. [16] use this setup to present a renement to the solution of the room-
mate problem. They consider the matchings that arise as from a blocking dynamics with
vanishing mistakes, i.e.  ! 0, and show that for any roommate market the set of such
matchings (stochastically stable matchings) coincides with the set of absorbing matchings.
8An important assumption of the model is that all possible matchings are proposed
with a positive probability. Given that in our decentralized market oers are made by the
agents, this is not guaranteed. However, our experimental data shows that, in spite of
the relatively small number of rounds, all possible matchings have been proposed at some
point during the experiment (table 13 in appendix C). The only exception seems to be the
matching 12345, but it was the one proposed by the computer as the original matching in
104%, while the  linked to acceptance decisions is 25% (table 4). The latter is
the relevant empirical result for Klaus el al. [16].
Observation 3. Subjects make systematic mistakes when oering and when
accepting oers. The probability of doing so is signicantly dierent from
zero and does not diminish with time (experience).
Table 3: Proportion of acceptance decisions in line with na ve strategies.
information incomplete complete total
game 1 2 total 1 2 total
# of decisions 125 179 304 106 101 207 511
length (time) 67.5' 67.5' 135.0' 67.5' 67.5' 135.0' 270.0'
R(0) S(0) H(0) 75% 73% 74% 72% 74% 73% 73%
H(1) 56% 42% 48% 53% 55% 54% 50%
S(1) H(0) 48% 39% 42% 45% 49% 47% 44%
H(1) 42% 27% 33% 38% 44% 41% 36%
R(1) S(0) H(0) 76% 75% 75% 74% 76% 75% 75%
H(1) 57% 43% 49% 55% 56% 56% 51%
S(1) H(0) 49% 40% 43% 47% 49% 48% 45%
H(1) 42% 28% 34% 40% 44% 42% 37%
R(): 0 - oer from the best agent, 1 - oer from an agent who is better
than the status quo;
S(): 0 - oer from matched or unmatched agents, 1 - oer from un-
matched agents only;
H(): 0 - oer from agents who have and who have not been a partner
before, 1 - oer from agents who have not been a partner before, 2 - oer
from agents who have not been a partner nor have rejected before.
As for the dierences between our two informational treatments, infor-
mation on the others' preferences does not alter the level of rationality, nor
the ranking of the analyzed na ve strategies. It does, however, reduce the
total number of oers and the total number of blocking pairs. This is a fairly
intuitive result, since knowing how the others think about the oerer can
help to judge potential partners better and can avoid sending oers that are
likely to be rejected.
Observation 4. The amount of information does not have a signicant ef-
fect on agents' rationality level, but it is important for their activity level:
more oers are made and more blocking pairs are formed if information is
incomplete.
It is interesting that the statistically signicant dierence between the two
informational treatments in terms of oer and acceptance counts is mostly
each round.
11Table 4: The evolution of  over time, i.e. the evolution of the average pro-
portion of decisions that are not in line with the R(1) - S(0) - H(0) na ve
strategy.
oer decisions acceptance decisions
complete inf. incomplete inf. complete inf. incomplete inf.
round game 1 game 2 game 1 game 2 total game 1 game 2 game 1 game 2 total
1 12% 4% 8% 33% 17% 27%
2 7% 5% 6% 24% 27% 25%
3 6% 2% 4% 19% 18% 19%
4 3% 3% 3% 14% 38% 27%
5 1% 6% 4% 26% 3 28%
6 8% 2% 5% 39% 35% 38%
7 3% 3% 3% 11% 1 11%
8 1% 6% 3% 16% 18% 17%
9 4% 4% 4% 18% 22% 2
10 5% 5% 5% 45% 29% 37%
total 6% 4% 4% 4% 4% 24% 25% 26% 24% 25%
# 348 463 307 379 1497 125 179 106 101 511
driven by dierences in game 2. While the activity level is always higher
in the complete information scenario, the observed dierences in oer and
acceptance decisions for game 1 are only signicant at 10% and at 20%,
respectively.
4.2 Stability
Our observations on individual behavior in the experimental laboratory sug-
gest that the vast majority of participants act as predicted by the theoretical
models, i.e. they are guided by the sole objective of improving upon their
current situation. However, a non-negligible and non-decreasing portion of
actions can not be reconciled with theory. We shall refer to them as indi-
vidual mistakes. In this section, we study how they aect the outcome of
the interaction and, in particular, we look at the observed stability of the
theoretically-stable matchings.
The most important nding is that the above-detailed individual behav-
ior renders the theoretical concept of stable matching a less accurate so-
lution concept for the roommate problem (table 5). We observe that al-
though groups reach stable matchings through the decentralized interaction
of agents, they also frequently abandon them.
Observation 5. The nal matching reached through decentralized interaction
in the laboratory coincides with the theoretically-stable matching in approxi-
12Table 5: Stability of theoretically-stable matchings.
information incomplete complete total
game 1 2 total 1 2 total
# of blocking pairs 110 166 276 101 93 194 470
length (time) 67.5' 67.5' 135.0' 67.5' 67.5' 135.0' 270.0'
% of rational blocking pairs 73% 80% 77% 70% 80% 75% 76%
% of irrational blocking pairs 27% 20% 23% 30% 20% 25% 24%
# of reached stable matchings 9 21 30 18 10 28 58
# of nal stable matchings 2 5 7 6 7 13 20
% of nal stable matchings 22% 24% 23% 33% 70% 46% 34%
# of abandoned stable matchings 7 16 23 12 3 15 38
% of abandoned stable matchings 78% 76% 77% 67% 30% 54% 66%
% of periods with stable nal matching 13% 33% 23% 40% 47% 43% 33%
mately 1
3 of all cases. Also, 2
3 of all theoretically-stable matchings (that are
reached) are abandoned.
Even if the individual levels of rationality are unaected by the amount
of information, information has a signicant role on the stability of the ob-
served nal matchings and on the empirical performance of theoretically-
stable matching in general.
Observation 6. Signicantly less theoretically-stable matchings are aban-
doned under complete information than under incomplete information (54%
vs. 77%, p-value=0.06). Also the proportion of periods, i.e. experimental
markets, that conclude with a theoretically-stable matching is higher under
complete information (43% vs. 23%, p-value=0.03).
Following our previous speculations on the eects of incomplete informa-
tion on individual behavior, in light of our observations we believe that it
makes participants to keep sending oers even if the status quo is theoretically-
stable. Then, individual mistakes (whose probability is not aected by the
level of information) have a wider ground to move the market to an unsta-
ble matching. It is interesting that the total number of theoretically-stable
matchings reached during a treatment is not signicantly aected by the
amount of information.
Motivated by the possibility that decentralized roommate markets may
fail to have a theoretically-stable matching, and also by the related exper-
imental literature that delivers observations on the instability of matching
markets, Eriksson and H aggstr om [8] dene two measures of instability. The
instability index of a matching is dened as the proportion of blocking pairs
among all possible pairs of agents (including singles). Then, the relative in-
stability index of a matching  is the proportion of those matchings (among
13all possible matchings) whose stability index is strictly lower than 's. Table
12 (in appendix C) and gures 1 and 2 show how unstable are the matchings
in our example. Given that the instability and relative instability indexes are
highly correlated (0.98 in game 1, 0.97 in game 2), only the instability index
that is slightly more correlated to the duration of matchings is included in
the gures.9
The gures show that the theoretically-stable matchings|marked with
empty circles as their instability index is equal to 0|are durable. Neverthe-
less, they are \outperformed" by other matchings. 14523 in game 1, and by
13254, 15432 and 42513 in game 2. It is not clear why this pattern arises,
since these matchings are not stable, nor lie on the blocking path to a stable
matching (gure 3 in appendix C).
Figure 1: Observed in/stability of matchings in game 1.
















































Note: The theoretically-stable matching is marked with empty circle.
4.3 Rationality in stable matchings
The previous sections have shown how theoretically-stable matching have
proven to be rather unstable in the experimental laboratory due to systematic
9The correlation between the duration and the instability index is -0.46 in game 1 and
-0.44 in game 2. Between the duration and the relative instability index it is -0.45 and
-0.41, respectively.
14Figure 2: Observed in/stability of matchings in game 2.

















































Note: The theoretically-stable matching is marked with empty circle.
mistakes made by subjects that otherwise seem to behave in line with the
assumptions of the theoretical models (they try to improve upon the status
quo by forming blocking pairs). In this section we analyze whether stable
matchings are special in terms of subjects' rationality level.10
As opposed to the overall results, in stable matchings signicantly more
oers are made and are accepted in the full information treatment.
Other than that, situations that are considered stable by theoretical mod-
els are not dierent from the others in terms of subjects' rationality when
making oers. However, acceptance decisions show a signicantly lower ratio-
nality level. In any case, the na ve strategy described by the R(1)-S(0)-H(0)
combination excels (just like in the overall analysis) in explaining the data.
Observation 7. While 95% of all oer decisions made in stable matchings
can be considered as rational, i.e. are in line with the R(1)-S(0)-H(0) na ve
strategy, signicantly less, barely 18% of all acceptance decisions in the same
situations are rational.
This observation gives additinal support to our previous nding according
to which subjects are more prone to make mistakes when considering and
10Tables 8 to 11 in appendix A oer the results of the throughout statistical analysis
whose main ndings are reported in the text.
15accepting an oer than when sending one. The rationality level of oers
seem to be stable, 95% in stable matching and 96% in general, while the
rationality level of acceptance decisions is lower in stable matchings, 18%,
than in general, 75%. Information does not aect the rationality of oers or
acceptance decisions in a signicant way.
5 Conclusions
Individual mistakes render the theoretically-stable matchings a less accurate
solution for the roommate problem. People seem to behave in line with
theoretical assumptions most of the time, i.e. their actions are guided by the
desire to improve upon the status quo, nevertheless they also make mistakes.
These errors are persistent: they do not disappear with time and experience.
Moreover, although the lack of information on the others' preferences does
not seem to aect people's rationality level, it does render more theoretically-
stable matchings unstable in the experimental laboratory. For this reason,
renements, like the so-called stochastically stable matchings (Klaus et al.,
[16]) are of little help, since although they allow for individual mistakes,
they essentially consider the limiting case in which their probability goes to
zero. We wish to join Eriksson and H aggstr om [8] in calling attention to the
(empirical) instability of matching markets that requires its presence in the
theoretical analysis, too.
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20A Tables on rationality at stable matchings
Table 8: Proportion of oer decisions in theoretically-stable matchings in line
with na ve strategies.
information incomplete complete total
game 1 2 total 1 2 total
# of oers 54 96 150 74 143 217 367
% of all oers 16% 21% 18% 24% 38% 32% 25%
% of oers by unmatched 39% 31% 34% 27% 14% 18% 25%
length (time) 9.9' 14.3' 24.2' 18.6' 25.3' 43.8' 68.0'
% of oers with
R(0) S(0) H(0) 44% 59% 54% 62% 83% 76% 67%
H(1) 43% 48% 46% 58% 73% 68% 59%
H(2) 24% 11% 16% 39% 36% 37% 29%
S(1) H(0) 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
H(1) 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
H(2) 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
R(1) S(0) H(0) 93% 91% 91% 96% 99% 98% 95%
H(1) 54% 60% 58% 69% 85% 79% 71%
H(2) 31% 18% 28% 46% 46% 46% 37%
S(1) H(0) 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
H(1) 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
H(2) 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
R(-1) S(0) H(0) 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
H(1) 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
H(2) 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
S(1) H(0) 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
H(1) 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
H(2) 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
R(): -1 - oer to the agent that values the oerer most, 0 - oer to the
best agent, 1 - oer to an agent who is better than the status quo;
S(): 0 - oer to matched or unmatched agents, 1 - oer to unmatched
agents only;
H(): 0 - oer to agents who have and who have not been a partner
before, 1 - oer to agents who have not been a partner before, 2 - oer
to agents who have not been a partner nor have rejected before.
21Table 9: Proportion of acceptance decisions in theoretically-stable matchings
in line with na ve strategies.
information incomplete complete total
game 1 2 total 1 2 total
# of decisions 9 19 28 13 3 16 44
% of all decisions 7% 11% 9% 12% 3% 8% 9%
length (time) 9.9' 14.3' 24.2' 18.6' 25.3' 43.8' 68.0'
% of decisions with
R(0) S(0) H(0) 22% 21% 21% 15% 0% 13% 18%
H(1) 22% 16% 18% 0% 0% 0% 11%
S(1) H(0) 22% 11% 14% 0% 0% 0% 9%
H(1) 22% 5% 11% 0% 0% 0% 7%
R(1) S(0) H(0) 22% 21% 21% 15% 0% 13% 18%
H(1) 22% 16% 18% 0% 0% 0% 11%
S(1) H(0) 22% 11% 14% 0% 0% 0% 9%
H(1) 22% 5% 11% 0% 0% 0% 7%
R(): 0 - oer from the best agent, 1 - oer from an agent who is better
than the status quo;
S(): 0 - oer from matched or unmatched agents, 1 - oer from un-
matched agents only;
H(): 0 - oer from agents who have and who have not been a partner
before, 1 - oer from agents who have not been a partner before, 2 - oer














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































B.1 Complete information treatment
The purpose of this experiment is to study how people make decisions in a
particular situation. If you have any question, you can pose it at any time
by raising your hand rst. From this moment until the end of the session
any communication among participants is forbidden.
The instructions are simple and if you follow them carefully you will receive
some money in cash by the end of the experiment. The money that you
earn partly depends on your decisions, but also on the decisions of the other
members in your group. At the end of the session, payments will be made
condentially, so no one will receive information about the earnings of the
other participants.
Instructions
This session consists of 1 practice round and 10 paying rounds that will
determine your nal payo. At the beginning, the computer will randomly
assign the participants into groups of ve. This assignment will change in
each round, so you are likely to interact with a dierent group of people from
round to round.
In each round, your task is to form a couple with another member of your
group. The money that you earn depends on who is your partner at the end
of the round. In order to nd a partner, you have the opportunity to send
oers to any member of your group, and also to receive oers from them. If
you want, you also have the option of staying alone.
In each round, you will be randomly assigned an identication number from
1 to 5 and a payo table that shows your earnings at the end of each round
depending on who is your partner.
The upper part of the screen displays the parameters of the experiment. On
the left hand side the payos are shown, while on the right hand side you can
see the current matching of participants in your group. In the center, you
nd your identication number, the identication number of your current
partner and the payo that this partner gives you.
If you are, for example, player 2 and your partner is player 4, then your
payo can be seen in the 4th row and 2nd column of the payo matrix. In
this case, player 4's payo is located in the 2nd row and 4th column of the
table.
25In order to make an oer, write the identication number of the participant
in the purple box that appears in the center of the screen and click the button
\send oer".
The lower part of the screen shows the oers you have sent and received. On
the left hand side you can check the list of the oers that you have received.
The table shows you who has made the oer and also its status (\pending"
for new oers). In order to accept or to reject an oer, you have to select the
oer by clicking on its row and then clicking on one of the buttons; \accept
oer" and \reject oer". The status of the oer will change accordingly. If
you happen to accept an oer your partner's identication number and your
payo are updated immediately. On the right hand side you see the list of
the oers you have made. If you regret sending an oer you can withdraw it
by selecting its row and clicking the button \withdraw oer".
You can only make one oer at a time. It means that you can only send
a new oer if the previous one has been accepted, rejected by someone or
withdrawn by you.
Note that there are three ways of being alone in this experiment.
1. You do not make and do not accept any oer. Participants are alone
at the start of each round.
2. If you already have a partner, but your partner decides to abandon you
and form a couple with somebody else.
3. If you already have a partner, but you send an oer to yourself and you
accept it.
Each round lasts for 4.5 minutes. Your identication number and payo
table may change from round to round.
Payment
At the end of each round, the computer will show the nal matching within
your group and determine your payment taking into account who is your
partner. The average earning along the 10 periods will give your nal pay-
ment.
26B.2 Incomplete information treatment
The purpose of this experiment is to study how people make decisions in a
particular situation. If you have any question, you can pose it at any time
by raising your hand rst. From this moment until the end of the session
any communication among participants is forbidden.
The instructions are simple and if you follow them carefully you will receive
some money in cash by the end of the experiment. The money that you
earn partly depends on your decisions, but also on the decisions of the other
members in your group. At the end of the session, payments will be made
condentially, so no one will receive information about the earnings of the
other participants.
Instructions
This session consists of 1 practice round and 6 paying rounds that will de-
termine your nal payo. At the beginning, the computer will randomly
assign the participants into groups of ve. This assignment will change in
each round, so you are likely to interact with a dierent group of people from
round to round.
In each round, your task is to form a couple with another member of your
group. The money that you earn depends on who is your partner at the end
of the round. In order to nd a partner, you have the opportunity to send
oers to any member of your group at any time, and also to receive oers
from them. If you want, you also have the option of staying alone.
In each round, you will be randomly assigned an identication number from
1 to 5 and a payo table that shows your earnings at the end of each round
depending on who is your partner.
The upper part of the screen displays the parameters of the experiment. On
the left hand side the payos are shown, while on the right hand side you can
see the current matching of participants in your group. In the center, you
nd your identication number, the identication number of your current
partner and the payo that this partner gives you.
It is important that the payo table shows your prot depending on who is
your partner. The other participants have similar payo tables, but they are
typically dierent from yours. Payo tables are private information and no
one has information about the others' payos.
27In order to make an oer, write the identication number of the participant
in the purple box that appears in the center of the screen and click the button
\send oer".
The lower part of the screen shows the oers you have sent and received. On
the left hand side you can check the list of the oers that you have received.
The table shows you who has made the oer and also its status (\pending"
for new oers). In order to accept or to reject an oer, you have to select the
oer by clicking on its row and then clicking on one of the buttons; \accept
oer" and \reject oer". The status of the oer will change accordingly. If
you happen to accept an oer your partner's identication number and your
payo are updated immediately. On the right hand side you see the list of
the oers you have made. If you regret sending an oer you can withdraw it
by selecting its row and clicking the button \withdraw oer".
You can only make one oer at a time. It means that you can only send
a new oer if the previous one has been accepted, rejected by someone or
withdrawn by you.
Note that there are three ways of being alone in this experiment.
1. You do not make and do not accept any oer. Participants are alone
at the start of each round.
2. It you already have a partner, but your partner decides to abandon you
and form a couple with somebody else.
3. If you already have a partner, but you send an oer to yourself and you
accept it.
Each round lasts for 4.5 minutes. Your identication number and payo
table may change from round to round.
Payment
At the end of each round, the computer will show the nal matching within
your group and determine your payment taking into account who is your
partner. The average earning along the 10 periods will give your nal pay-
ment.
2829C Additional tables
Table 12: Observed in/stability of matchings.
game 1 game 2
matching duration instability rel. instability duration instability rel. instability
12345 21.0 0.5 1.0 - 0.5 0.9
12354 10.2 0.4 0.8 18.8 0.2 0.3
12435 11.5 0.5 0.9 14.1 0.3 0.7
12543 20.6 0.3 0.5 13.0 0.4 0.8
13245 13.0 0.3 0.7 14.7 0.4 0.8
13254 - 0.2 0.3 67.3 0.1 0.1
14325 35.4 0.5 0.9 22.3 0.2 0.3
14523 50.0 0.3 0.5 22.9 0.1 0.1
15342 23.3 0.2 0.3 7.0 0.3 0.7
15432 37.5 0.1 0.1 68.0 0.3 0.6
21345 27.6 0.2 0.3 18.6 0.3 0.6
21354 24.2 0.1 0.1 20.4 0.1 0.0
21435 14.4 0.1 0.1 18.3 0.1 0.1
21543 39.5 0.1 0.0 14.9 0.2 0.3
32145 22.0 0.3 0.7 5.5 0.5 0.9
32154 43.4 0.2 0.3 12.3 0.3 0.6
34125 17.0 0.3 0.5 13.6 0.2 0.3
35142 46.1 0.0 0.0 7.5 0.4 0.8
42315 19.6 0.4 0.8 15.5 0.2 0.3
42513 10.5 0.2 0.3 40.5 0.1 0.1
43215 - 0.3 0.5 17.8 0.2 0.3
45312 36.1 0.1 0.0 31.3 0.1 0.1
52341 11.5 0.3 0.5 12.9 0.3 0.6
52431 21.2 0.2 0.3 15.3 0.2 0.3
53241 32.0 0.1 0.1 11.9 0.2 0.3
54321 33.8 0.2 0.3 37.7 0.0 0.0
Matching code: agent 1's partner, agent 2's partner, etc.
Duration: measured in seconds, rst and last matchings are excluded.
Instability and stability indexes: as dened in the text.
30Table 13: Distribution of the matchings proposed by subjects.
matching game 1 game 2 total
12345 1% 0% 0%
12354 5% 6% 6%
12435 4% 6% 5%
12543 7% 1% 4%
13245 5% 5% 5%
13254 1% 2% 1%
14325 7% 7% 7%
14523 1% 5% 3%
15342 6% 11% 9%
15432 6% 0% 3%
21345 6% 11% 9%
21354 2% 3% 3%
21435 2% 1% 1%
21543 2% 2% 2%
32145 2% 1% 2%
32154 5% 2% 3%
34125 4% 4% 4%
35142 7% 1% 4%
42315 6% 8% 7%
42513 2% 1% 1%
43215 2% 1% 2%
45312 7% 1% 4%
52341 7% 2% 4%
52431 2% 3% 3%
53241 1% 9% 5%
54321 2% 5% 3%
total 100% 100% 100%
Matching code: agent 1's partner,
agent 2's partner, etc.

























































































































































Star: stable matching; Circle: matching on the path to a stable matching.
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